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Abstract
Unique factors in commercial banks' environment may influence the nature and effectiveness  of
their corporate  control mechanism.  I investigate  this issue  in a sample  of U.S.  bank holding
companies (BHCs) by analyzing how many underwent a change  in corporate control by hostile
takeover,  friendly merger,  management  turnover  by the board,  or intervention  by regulators. I
examine  the relative  importance  of these  different methods  and  whether  they differ from those
employed  in nonfinancial  firms. I also  relate the use of these  different methods  to BHC board
and ownership structure, and performance.  I find that the the most important  corporate control
mechanism among BHCs is intervention by regulators, suggesting  that the corporate control
problem in banks may be more severe  than in other firms.  I also find  Ihat the primary market-
baced  mechanism  of corporate  control for BHCs is action  by the board. Overall,  however,  BHC
boards are much /ess  assertive  than their countemarts at nonfinancial firms.  I examine reasons
for this.
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This  article  investigates  the  corporate  control  mechanism  that  operates  in commercial  banks.
The term corporate control mechanism  refers to the various methods by which bank owners  attempt
to force bank management  to follow value-maximizing  policies. Various devices  can motivate such
managerial discipline.  External devices-the market for takeovers, external capital, and the final
output of the firm--can  all in theory discipline  managers  by threatening  them with replacement  or
bankruptcy  of their firm.  Internal devices  consist  of direct monitoring performed by boards  of
directors  and large shareholders,  and the ma:ragement  compensation  contract,  which can  provide
incentives to maximize value by giving managers  equity-like shares  in the firm.  This paper analyzes
the use  of some  of these  corporate  control devices  in banks.
Although  the research on the corporate control mechanism in nonfinancial firms is vast,
there is surprisingly  little research  on the corporate  control mechanism  operating  in banks. Yet,
analysis  of the corporate  control  mechanism  in banks  is important for a number  of reasons.  First,
despite its supposed  decline in recent years, banking remains an extremely important industry, that
acts as the main interface between savers  and investors.
Second, such analysis contributes to  our  understanding of  the  different  ways in  which
corporate control mechanisms  operate in firms under different legal and regulatory environments.
The  considerable differences  between the  legal  and  regulatory  environment  of  banks  and
nonfinancial  firms  may imply  substantial differences in  the  nature  and effectiveness of  their
respective  corporate control mechanisms. In particular, federal and state  restrictions on the market
fbr  corporate control  for banks and the oligopolistic advantages  that commercial banks have in
issuing insured debt may mean that important external market mechanisms  for  disciplining
managers-the  takeover  and product market-are significantly  weaker for banks. The regulatory
environment  of the commercial  banking  industry may substitute  to some  degree  for the weakermarket mechanisms  of corporate control.  However, intervention by the regulatory authorities is
widely  regarded  as  a poor, more costly  substitute  for market control  mechanisms,  both because  of
bureaucratic and political  problems that  interfere  with  the  efficient  functioning  of  regulatory
agencies  ald because  maximizing  shareholder  value (the objective  of market mechanisms)  is not
the same  as  minimizing  the probability  of failure (the regulator's  objective).  This article  addresses
the question of whether these differences in  the regulatory  environment  of banks relative  to
nonfinanciai firms have produced greater reliance on internal devices  for corporate control-active
boards  and large,  active  shareholders-or,  if not, whether  the corporate  control  problem is simply
more severe  in commercial  banking.
Third, such analysis  may provide information  on whether commercial banks suffered from
a corporate  control problem in the 1980s,  as some  researchers  have  recently  proposed  (see,  for
example,  Gorton and Rosen  (1992)). Many analysts  claim that over the past ten to fifteen years
the U.S.  commercial  banking  industry  has  suffered  a significant  decLine  in performance,  including
a loss  in market share  to nonbank  competitors  (such  as  securities  markets,  mutual funds,  insura-nce
companies, finance companies and foreign  banks), substantial falls in bank profitability,  and a
skyrocketing  bank  failure  rate.' All this  has  occurred  despite  intense  merger  and  acquisition  activity
among  banks  that was supposed  to improve productivity and cost efficiency. Many researchers
believe that the reasons  for this decline are secular in nature; and that the recent recovery in bank
profitability  will prove to be only a temporary phenomenon  with commercial banking continuing to
decline  relative  to other financial  institutions  over the long term.
Researchers  have  proposed  numerous  reasons  for the commercial  banking  industry's  woes
in the 1980s.  Greater  competition  tiom nonbanks  and  a  heavier  federal  regulatory  burden  are  often
'For some  documentation  of these  trends  see  Gorton and Rosen  (1992). Note that the claim that the
banking industry is in decline  is by no means  universally accepted. On this issue  see  Boyd and Gertler (1994),
Levonian  (1995),  Kaufnan and  Mote (1994),  and  artides  in the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Chicago  (1994).J
put forward as  reasons  for this apparent  decline.' Others  point to the moral hazard  problems  that
appear  particularly  severe  in the banking  industry.t This article  addresses  another  possible  reason
fbr the relative  underperformance  of banks:  that the corporate  control mechanism  in commercial
banks is less effective than in nonbank firms.
Finally, from a public poliry viewpoint, examination of the corporate control mechanism  in
banks may be useful in evaluating the industry's current legal and regulatory environment, and also
some  of the recently  proposed  banking  legislation  that may amend  or eliminate  provisions  in the
Glass-Steagall  Act. While much  of the current  and  proposed  legislation  has  been  evaluated  in terms
of the desirability of allowing commercial banks to engage  in securities underwriting or in selling
insurance, there has been little  analysis  in terms ofthe  effects on the corporate control mechanism
that operates  in banks,  even  though  some  of the proposed  changes  in banking  law  would  loosen  the
restrictions  on bank o*nership,  with potential  effects  both on the structure  of bank ownership  and
the bank takeover market.  In this article, I attempt to provide such analysis.
I ana$ze the corporate  control mechanism  in U.S. commercial  bank holding companies
(BHCs) over the period  7987-7992  using data on the number of managers  versus outsiders on  a
BHC's board of directors,  the ownership  structure  of the BHC including  directors'  shareholdings
and the stakes  of the BHCs largest  shareholders,  and various  measures  of bank performance. I
relate these  variables  to five types of corporate  control change  a BHC could undergo over the
sample  period: hostile  takeover,  friendly acquisition,  rernoval  of top management  by the board of
directors, intervention  by regulators, and no control  change.  I  use these data to  examine the
relative importance and effectiveness  of the different methods of disciplining managers  in BHCs
and how they differ from those employed in nonfinancial firms.
2See,  for example,  E1y (1992).
'See Keeley (1990) and McManus and Rosen (1991).A.
Some  questions  this article addresses  are:  what are the primary means  by which managers
are disciplined in commercial banks?  What is the frequenry  and effectiveness  with which these
means  are used? For example,  what is the frequenry  of top management  turnover in commercial
banks? Is turnover related to measures  of bank performance? How important are boards of
directors in disciplining  top management  relative to alternative  control devices  such as hostile
takeovers,  friendly acquisitions and intervention by regulators? What is the structure of ownership
in commercial  banks  and is it related to bank  performance?  As mentioned  above,  many  of these
questions  have  been  addressed  for U.S. nonfinancial  firms (see  for example,  Morck, Shleifer  and
Vishny  (1989)  and  Jensen  and Murphy (1990)),  so  some  standards  are available  with which  results
for the banking sector can be compared. This study borrows in particular the method employed in
Morck, Shleifer  and Vishny (1989)  (MSV) for their sample  of manufacturing  firms.
In the next section of this article I outline the factors that are unique to the commercial
banking  sector that  may affect  the  nature  and the  effectiveness of  its  corporate  governance
mechanism  and I survey  the academic  research  on corporate  governance  problems  in commercial
banks. The subsequent  section  describes  the data and discusses  the empirical  results. The final
section  concludes.
The corporate control mechanism in commercial banks
Does  the  legal  ald regulatory  environment  of U.S.  commercial  banks  today  imply a different
system  of corporate  governance  than is observed  in other sectors  of the economy? Many unique
factors in the commercial bank operating environment may influence the nature and effectiveness
of the corporate  control mechanism  in commercial  banks.
The first unique lactor is federal regulation of the takeover market.  The threat of a
takeover of a firm, in which management  usually is replaced, can discipline managers  to act in the
interests  of shareholders.  Restrictions  on the tlpe or number of potential acquirers  of the firm5
make takeovers less likely  and thus limit  the credibility  of the takeover threat.  In the banking
sector,  there traditionally  have  been  significant  restrictions  on the takeover  market. For example,
the Bank Holding  Company Act  (as amended in  1970) and the National Banking Act  generally
require  that  the  acquirer  of  a commercial bank also be a commercial bank  or  bank holding
company-mergers  between  nonbank  corporations  and  commercial  banks  are  prohibited-and there
are more general  restrictions  on the ownership  of banks  by nonfinancial  corporations.
In addition,  federal  regulation  may  make  permitted  hostile  takeovers  within the commercial
banking sector much more expensive  and time consuming  than in nonbank sectors  of the economy.
Interstate banking regulations may for example  prohibit  many possible bank mergers. In addition,
bank takeovers tpical$  face extensive delays. This tendency may lower the frequenry of hostile
takeovers, which typical$  depend for their success  on the ability to close the transaction quickly.
Bank takeovers require prior  approval from  one of  the three federal bank regulators-the
Comptroller of the Currency,  the Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC) or the Federal
Reserve  Board-and state  authorities  (see  Baradwaj,  Fraser  and Furtado (1990)). After approval
is granted there is a thirty-day waiting period so the Justice Department can scrutinize the takeover
attempt.  In  all, the takeover process  can last four months or longer.  In  many cases,  these
restrictions may make the threat  of a takeover in commercial banking insufficient  to discipline
managefs.
Such restrictions  may  also  influence  the  ownership  structure  of  commercial  banks.
Currently, nonfinancial corporations and firms in important financial sectors  such as the insurance
industry  are prohibited  from  owning commercial banks.  To  a large extent, the  law restricts
ownership  commercial  banks  to individuals  and other commercial  banks. To the degree  that this
restriction  reduces  the likelihood  that banks  will have  equity  holders  with large  stakes  at risk, it also
may reduce the effectiveness  of one mechanism  of corporate control: the monitoring and oversighto
performed  by shareholders  motivated  by their large  holdings.
Another  unique factor is the effect of deposit insurance on the moral hazard problem in
banking.  As is  the case  with any  limited liability firm with debt  outstanding,  bank  stockholders  have
incentives to take on inefficient  risk.  However the problem is more acute in commercial banks
where  stockholders  are in addition  subject  to the distorting  incentives  arising  from the existence  of
fixed price deposit insurance prernia.  These premia result in a subsidy to bank shareholders  that
increases in value with  the riskiness of the bank  Thus bank shareholders have even stronger
incentives to take on inefficiently  risky investments that benefit themselves  at the expense  of the
deposit  insurance  fund and the taxpayers  that back  the fund.o
Competition in the product market can play a role in reducing the extent to which managers
shirk  from value  maximization  goals.  Together  with thrifts,  credit  unions  and  government  sponsored
enterprises,  commercial banks  have  traditionally had strong oligopolistic advantages  on the liabilities
side  of their business-the  issuance  of insured  debt. This oligopolistic  position  may  have  given  banks
the scope  to be more inefficient in some  aspects  of their business,  for example,  in the degree  to
which managers follow  value maxirnizing policies, yet  still  be competitive with  other  financial
institutions  that  have not  had  the benefit  of issuing liabilities  backed by a federal guarantee.
However, the advantages  from issuing  insured debt for banks likely have declined over recent years
with the emergence  of numerous good substitutes, such as money market mutual funds.
Federal regulation  and moral hazard  clearly  play a role in shaping  the corporate  control
mechanism  that operates  in banks,  and in particular are likely to make it  operate  significantly
differently  from the corporate  control  mechanism  at  work in other  firms. Nevertheless,  there  is only
a relatively small amount of literature,  particularly  of recent vintage, that altempts to document
"Risk-based  deposit insurance  premiums were introduced by a provision of the FDIC Imlnovenent Act in
1993.  This change  does  not effect  my empirical  results  since  my sample  period  ends  in 1992.empirically  the existence  of corporate  control  problems  between  bank shareholders  and  managers.
Much of this work uses  data  from the 1970s  and  earlier and  thus  has  an uncertain  relevance  to the
banking industry as it now is configured.s
Another  set of work  analyzes differences in  the effectiveness of  the corporate control
mechanism  between  banks  in states  with different  regulatory  attitudes  towards  bank  merger  activity.
For example,  Schranz  (1993)  finds that banks  in states  with less  burdensome  takeover  regulations
are more profitable.  In states  where takeover  activity is more restricted,  Schranz  observes  the
increased  use  of other corporate  control mechanisms,  such  as  concentrated  equity ownership  and
management ownership of stock, but these alternative mechanisms  appear to have a smaller effect
on profitability  and therefore  do  not  completely compensate for  the  more  restricted  merger
environment. Hubbard and Palia (1995)  find that in states  with a more competitive  bank merger
market,  CEO pay is higher and more tightly related  to performance.6
While  Schranz and  Hubbard  and  Palia  provide  evidence that  the  corporate  control
mechanism  in banks differs across  states  with different merger regulations, they say nothing about
the effectiveness  of the governance  mechanism in banks as a whole relative to nonbanks.  Given
that there are severe  federal restrictions on the banking merger market one might expect  this to be
translated into differences in the way banks are governed relative to nonbanks, much as Schranz
found that restricted merger market in  some states resulted in  the increased  use of  other
rnechanisms  of corporate  control among  banks. This paper addresses  this issue.
Allen and Cebenoyan  (1991),  Gorton and Rosen  (1994) and Houston and James.(1993)
present evidence  on the behavior of commercial  banks in the 1980s  that is consistent  with a
rSee  for example  Edwards  (1977),  Glassman  antl Rhoades  (1980),  Hannan and  Mavinga (1980)  and  Sni  ock
and  Marshall  (1983).
6Janes  (1984) and Brickley and James  (1987)  perform similar studies  using data from the 1970s.8
corporate  control problem. Allen and Cebenoyan  find that banks  with entrenched  management
tend to engage  in the most  active  acquisition  programs,  consistent  with the view  that such  programs
are designed  to increase the perquisites available to management  (which vary direct\  with the size
of the firm)  rather than to  increase  profitability.  Gorton and Rosen present evidence  that
entrenched managers may be  a more  important  problem  in  banking than  the  moral  hazard
associated  with  deposit insurance.  The authors find  that banks that  are charactethed as having
managements  that are  relatively  free from outside  shareholder  control  make  the riskiest  and  most
unprofitable investments. Finally, Houston and James find  that bank CEOs have lower levels of
compensation, hold less stock and exhibit a weaker pay-performance relationship than CEOs in
other industries.
While these  studies  all find evidence  of a corporate  control  problem  in banks  in the 1980s,
none of them identifies  the aspects  of commercial  banks'  corporate  control mechanism  that may
be deficient  nor why these  deficiencies  may occur. This article attempts  to provide an initial pass
at such  an analysis  by examining the frequenry of different types  of corporate control change  among
BHCs in the late 1980s  and their relationship with the ownership,  board structure and performance
of the BHC.
Data and empirical results
Frequency of corporate control  changes. I  analyze the frequency with  which corporate control
changes  occur  in a sample  of BHCs over the period 7987-92,  and  the relative  importance  of those
corporate control mechanisms  that precipitate such  action, such  as  hostile takeovers,  other mergers,
internally driven board turnover of the management  team and intervention by regulators.  To analyze
the tiequency of alternative control changes,  I follow the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) method
in their study of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms.
I collected  data on the following  characteristics  of BHCs that existed  in 1987:  accounting9
data from  COMPUSTAT (from  1987-92)  and stock return data from the CRSP tapes (from
1983-86).  In addition,  I collected  data  on the composition  of the BHC's board  of directors  between
insiders and outsiders and their shareholdings in 1987,  and the shareholdings of greater-than-5Vo
owners  of the BHC in  1987  from the 10-K,  Annual Report, or other Securities  and Exchange
Commission  (SEC) tilings. I was  left with 234  BHCs in the sample,  including  all the largest  ones.
Of the 734  BHCs in the sample,  twenty-nine  were acquired  by third parties  during 1987-92,
based  upon an examination  of Securities  Data Corp.'s  Mergers  and  Acquisitions  database.  Four
transactions appear to  have started as hostile  takeovers and twenty-five as friendly  mergers.
Following  MSV, I record  an acquisition  as  hostile  if the initial bid for the target  was  unsolicited  and
not accepted  by the board in its initial form.7 Targets  that were not classified  as hostile were
recorded as  friendly. Hostile takeovers  almost by definition involve changes  in current management
and therefore  can be viewed as a change in  corporate control.  The  degree to which friendly
mergers  can  be so regarded  is somewhat  more doubtful. Friendly mergers  may be motivated  for
reasons  other than disciplining  management  to increase  shareholder  value--for  example,  they  may
be motivated  by a desire  to diversi$r  across  state  lines or capitalize  on another  bank's  customer
base.  And the fact tllat a friendly merger  offer is not contested  by current  management  may  mean
managers  believe  their jobs are secure. However,  this belief  may not prove true. In any case,  the
acquiring firm may keep current management  but force it to make poliry changes  that it otherwise
would not have  made. For these  reasons  I consider  friendly mergers  as  potential mechanisms  of
corporate  control change,  although  of a different nature  from hostile  takeovers.
TMSV  are hterested, as  I am, in the fum characteristics  that sparked  the initial bidding aad therefore classily
acquisitions  as hostile or friendly based on the initial mood of the bidding process. MSV thus take any of the
following as evidence  of a bidder's hostility  initial rejection of the bid by the target's board, escape  to a white
knight, or  a management  buyout in  response  to unsolicited pressure.  Thus, MSV's  definition of a hostile
acquisition does  not necessarily  require the succesful  aquiror to be the initial bidder (in the scase  of escape  to
a white knight, for example). In fact, in my sanple of bank holding conpanies, of the 4 acquisitions  classified
as hostile, all resulted in eventual  acouisition  bv the initial bidder.10
I attempt to classi8/  those BHCs in my sample that have experienced a top management
turnover. Again, following MSV, I define management  turnover as a complete  change  between
7987-92  n  the list of officers signing  the letter to shareholders  in the annual report.  A  BHC
erperiences a management turnover if none of the officers who signed the annual report in 1992
also signed five years earlier.  I consider such turnover to be the result of disciplinary management
changes  forced by the board of directors.t  A  BHC that has experienced a management turnover
prior to being  acquired  is classified  as  an acquisition,  not a turnover. This happens  in four cases,
in each of which the subsequent  merger is friendly.  As MSV  note, while the board is arguably
trying to deal with management  problems, the BHC's subsequent  acquisition is evidence that the
board's  action  is not providing  an adequate  solution. This definition of top management  turnover
yields  twenty-four  cases  of management  turnover.e
The final category  of corporate  control change  I consider  is intervention by regulators.
Intervention  may  be  viewed  as  a "last  resort"  mechanism  for those  BHCs that may  or may  not have
undergone  previous  corporate  control  changes  yet have  continued  to perform poorly. Each  federal
banking agency,  as  well as each state banking authourity, can impose a broad range of enforcement
actions on management.  Both formal and informal regulatory enforcement actions are a response
to poor performance  by the BHC in some  aspect  of its operations.  These  actions  involve  directing
current  management to  attain  specific capital  ratios,  suspend dividends, recti$  loan  quality
"Following MSV, I focus on complete  nther  than  panial turnover of the signers  of the annual report over
a five-year period because  I  am interested in disciplinary nanagement changes  forced by the board.  Most of
the changes  in which one cosigner of the ar:nual report replaces another (partial turnover) likely represent
ordinary succession  rather than disciplinary action  by the board. Of course,  counting as disciplinary turnover all
cases  where the list of signers  in 1987  was completely different fron  the list in  1992  nay include some cases
where there were two or more ordinary successions  (partial turnovert  within the five-year  period that resulted
in none of the 1987  signers  being signers  in 1992. This multiple partial turnover phenomenon  in fact occurs  in
only two cases  in my sanple.  When making comparisons  with the frequencies  reported by MSV, I count these
two cases  as  management  turnover in order to maintail  consistency  with MSVs definition. I do not count these
cases  as management  turnover in the remainder of this article.
eTwenty-two  when the two multiple partial turnover cases  are exduded.11
problems,  address  liquidity and concentration  problems  and the like.  They can  therefore  be seen
as  a last-resort,  nonmarket-based  external  mechanism  of management  discipline.
Since some informal enforeement  actions  are never made public, there is a problem in
identi$ing those BHCs that are sub.ject  to regulatory  intervention.'o One solution is to use the
BOPEC  rating-the rating assigned  to the BHC by Federal  Reserve  bank  examiners--and  to assume
that  those  BHCs  rated  unfavorably  were  subject  to some  form of regulatory  intewention." I assume
that  a BHC  comes under  regulatory  intervention  starting  in  the year that  it  first  receives a
composite  BOPEC rating of four or five.1'z  This definition yields forty-five cases  of regulatory
intervention." BHCs that underwent  a management  turnover  before  receiving  a BOPEC rating of
loEnforcement  actions  cal be formal or informal,  Formal actions  range  from cease  and desist  orders to civil
money  penalties  on managers  and directors, Formal actions  are regulators' most severe  forms of action and are
always  made public by regulators. Informal actions  range fron  commifinent  /efierJ-which set forth the reforms
the BHC  needs and the time frame within which those reforms are to be achieved-to manorandums of
understanding,  a document drafted by regulators and signed  by every member of the BHC board.  lnformal
actions  ale not nade public by the regulatory authorities. In some  but not every  case,  informal actions  will be
disclosed  by the BHC  itself if  it  is making a security offering nnd the enforcement action is deened to be
material infornation  to potential hvestots.  See  Rockett (194).
"The composite  BOPEC rating reflects  evaluations  on a scale  ftom 1 (strongest)  to 5 (wealest),  and is
arrived at by conbining the individual ratings assigned  to the BHC in five different component areas  (each of
which contributes  a letter to the acronym  BOPEC); namely,  the Bant subsidiaries,  Other nonbank subsidiaries,
the Parent company,  the level of consolidated  Earnings and the level of Capital adequacy.  As such,  the BOPEC
rating system  for  BHCs is structured very much like  the CAMEL  rating system  for  individual banks.  The
decision  to impose  specific  enforcement  actions  generally  depends  on the conposite BOPEC rating the institution
receives  in its periodic examination  by regulators. If  an examination  results in a composite  BOPEC rating of
3 or below, then the BHC is likely to require "more than normal' supervision  by the regulatory authorities (see
Federal Reserve  Regulatory Service,  vol. 2, paragraph  4{65).
llVhile  a composite  rating of three, four or five is likely to generate  some  supervision  by regulators,  I restrict
my defi:rition to include only the most egregious  cases  (those BHCs rated four or five) that require regulatory
intervention of a degree  that is likely to constitute a change  in corporate control.
r3I have experineuted with other definitions of the regulatory inte  ention group.  Defining the group to
consist  of BHCs that received  a BOPEC rating of three, four or five increases  the number of BHCs in the group
to 89.  When defined as consisting of those BHCs that, in any one year of the sample period placed in the
bottom decile of the sample  ranted by the percentage  of total assets  in the form of nonperforming or greater-
than-ninety-days-past-due  loans,  there are 33 BHCs in the group. While there are marked differences  in terms
of the numbets of BHCs in the regulatory intervention group, the characteristics  of the group as measured  in
table III,  and the regression coefficients and estimated probabilitues fron  the multinonial  logit  model as
reported in tables IV  and V do not differ significantly from those  reported here.four or five are  classified  as  being  in the regulatory  intervention  category,  not the turnover  category.
Again, the argument is that while the board may be trying to deal with  management problems,
subsequent  intervention by regulators is evidence  that the board's action is not an adequate  solution.
This happens in eight cases.
Table  I lists the frequenry  of these  various  corporate  control  events,  with those  of the MSV
study  of manufacturing  firms as  a standard  of comparison.  First note that, in terms  of percentages
of the sample  size,  total corporate  control changes  (defined  to include intervention  by regulators
for  the  BHC  sample) appear to  be  only slightly more frequent among BHCs relative to
manufacturing firms.  However, the composition of  total  control  changes between the various
alternatives  differs dramatically  between  the two groups. Market-based  corporate  control  changes
(excluding control changes  owing to regulatory intervention) are about two-thirds as  frequent among
the sample  of BHCs as they are for nonfinancial  firms.'n It appears  that the primary mechanism
of corporate  control change  among  BHCs in this period was  in fact intervention  by regulators.
Looking  at  the  relative  frequenry  of  the  market-based control  mechanisms-which is
invariant to the size of the regulatory intewention group-while  friendly mergers are slightly more
frequent among  the BHC sample,  hostile  takeovers  and management  turnover are markedly  less
frequent. For example,  MSV record  forty hostile  takeovers  representing  8.8  percent  of their sample
of nonfinancial  firms.  Similarly,  20.5  percent (ninety-three  cases)  of their sample  undergoes  an
internally  precipitated  management  turnover. In my sample  of BHCs,  only 1.7  percent  (four cases)
'oOf course,  comparilg frequencies  of total corporate changes  assunes that firms in the two samples  are
subject  to the same  degree  of corporate  control problems  ex ante  the use  of corporate  control  mechanisms
considered  in the artide.  In other words, that management  is being disciplined to the same  extent by other
corpotate control mechanisms  not considered  here, such as pay-for-performance  compensation  packages  and
competition in product markets. On this point, Houston and James  (1993)  present evidence  that the sensitivity
of CEO pay to firm performance  is significantly  lower in banks thar among  nonbanls.  This finding, combined
with the traditional partial insulation from conpetititon in product markets  that banks  enjoy  owing to their ability
to issue  insured liabilities, suggests  that the need for the corporate control rnechanisms  considered  in this article
m y be greater  inbanking than in other industries.undergo a hostile takeover,  while 10.2  percent (twenty-four cases)  of the sample  undergoesa
maf,ragement  turnover.ri  Thus hostile takeovers are over five times more frequent among
manufacturing  fkms than  among  BHCs,  confirming  the  conventional  wisdom. In addition,  however,
management turnover by the board appears twice as frequent in nonfinancial firms  as in BHCs.
Thus the lower frequenry of hostile  takeovers  among  BHCs does  not appear  to be reflected  in a
greater tendency  by boards to remove management  at BHCs than at manufacturing firms.'u Indeed,
boards at BHCs appear to be /ess  active in removing management  for disciplinary reasons.
The following sections  attempt to shed some light on these observations  by examining the
characteristics of BHCs employing different corporate control mechanisms.
Characteristics of firms subject to different control changes. I focus on a number of performance,
ownership and board characteristics  of BHCs on the assumption  that these  variables  may determine
which (if  any) control devices are used.  Definitions  and sources  for  these variables are given in
Table IL
I use two different measures  of performance of the BHC under eisting  management:  stock
market abnormal returns and a return on equity acrounting measure. Tlte stock market measure
of performance EETURN)  is the cumulative abnormal return  over the period  1985-86,  calculated
using  the capital  asset  pricing  model  (CAPM) parameterized  over  the four-year  period 1983-1986.1?
The data for returns are the standard  monthly series  from the CRSP tapes. This performance
r5My  measure  of turnover here inc.ludes  the two peviously noted cases  of multiple partial turnover in order
to naintain  cousistency  with the definition used  by MSV.
ltlouston  and James (1993) use a different measure  of management  turnover and find that management
turnover in banks is somewhat  less than in a sample of nonbanks.  but that the differences  are not statisticallv
significant.
11  restrict  myself  to the  period  1983-86  to parameterize  the CAPM because  Kane  and  Unal (1988)  identify
a break in the return-generating  process  for banks in  1982  related to changes  in the regulatory and financial
environment of bants during that year.14
measure  is calculated  over a period prior to 1987  to avoid capturing  any effects  of the market's
anticipations  of future corporate  control  changes.  Doing so  means  it is  more  likely that my  measure
is  capturing  the  market's  enpectations  of futue profitability of the BHC under  current  management,
not the expected  premium from a control change. The accounting  performance  measure  (ROE) is
the average  return on equity  frorn COMPUSTAT over the period 1987  to the date of any control
change,  or  1992 if  there was no control change.tt Since this is an accounting  measure of
performance  there  is  no contamination  from the  market's  expectations  about  future control  changes
and so no need  to calculate  the measure  over a period prior to 1987.
Ownership  characteristics  include  the equity holdings  of insiders  (INSIDE) and outsiders
(OUTSIDE) on the board of directors  in 1987  as a percentage  of total outstanding  shares.  Equity
holdings of insiders may proxy for  the entrenchment of current management and their financial
incentive to accept a friendly offer. Outsider equity holdings prory  for the incentive that outside
board  members  have  to perform monitoring duties  on current  management.  Insiders  are defined
as those members  of the board that are also members  of current management. Outsiders  are
defined as those  board members  that are not insiders  and also  not employees  of firms that may
have business  dealings  with the bank  Outsiders include primarily  academics,  retirees who are not
previous employees  of the bank, individuals, and those  listed as  chairman of investment groups  with
their own name.tt  In addition, the cumulative shareholdings-as a percentage of total outstanding
shares-ofthose  shareholders  holding  greater  than  5 percent  stakes  in the  BHC in 1987  are  reported
as large shareholders'  holdings (LARGE).  The greater are large shareholder's  stakes  in the
company,  the greater  their incentive  to ensure  that management  is maxirnizing  profits.  These  data
'?OE  is defired as income before extraotdinary items divided by cornmon equity.
'eThis follows Hermalin and Weisbach  (1988)  and Blrd  and Hickman (1992)  who define an outsider more
narrowly  than  just those  who are  not insiders.15
are obtained  from 10-Ks,  proxies  and other SEC filings.
Management  characteristics  include  a dummy (FF) indicating  whether any signer of the
annual report  is from  the founding family.  Top officer  members of the founding family were
identified  from  old  annual reports  and various editions  of  Who's IFho in Ameican  Banking.
Members of the founding family that are part of the top management team may have a special
ability to resist challenges  to their control even without a substantial ownership stake by virtue of
having  handpicked  the board over a long  period of time.'  In addition,  following  MSV, I record a
dummy variable (BO,S-S)  indicating  if  only one executive signs the annual report  and no other
executive  holds the title of chairman, chief executive officer or president of the BHC.  The BOSS
variable  tries to identi$ top executives  who either completely  dominate  the management  of the
BHC or else  have  no clear replacement,  and who therefore may be particularly  protected from
disciplinary  action  by the board. This variable  is constructed  from data from the annual  report.
Table  III presents  the means  of performance  measures  and ownership  and  board structure
characteristics  for five categories  of firms in my sample. The first four categories  include BHCs that
e4perienced  one of the four types of corporate control change:  management  turnover, hostile
takeover, friendly acquisition and regulatory intervention. The fifth category  includes the remaining
("no control change")  BHCs that did not experience  any control change. Astericks  indicate the
statistical  significance  of differences  in the means  of the control change  groups  relative  to the no
control change  group.
Table III  indicates that firms experiencing  management  turnover or regulatory intervantion
have  abnormal  stock  market returns of -11.5  percent  and -12.9  percent  respectiveiy  in the period
1985-86,  compared  to -1.9  percent  for fims experiencing  no control  change.  Targets  of friendly  bids
rFor  this reason, I  set Ftr'= 1 for  those BHCs for which a signer of the armual  report was related to an
immediate  previous  signer  of the annual  report, regardless  of whether  they  were members  of the founding family.16
have  abnormal  returns  of +9.5  percent,  wbile targets  ofhostile bids  have  abnormal  returns  of +5.3
percent. Each group's  performance  is statistically  different from that of the no control change
group,  except  for the hostile  group." The same  pattern of performance  between  corporate  control
groups is exhibited when the measure  of performance  is ROE:  BHCs in the regulatory and
management turnover group show signiticantly poorer performance than the no control change
group, whereas BHCs subject to a friendly merger show sigrificantly  better performance than the
no change  group. Performance in the hostile takeover group is not statistically significantly different
from that of the no controi change  group.
As expected, performance is reiatively poot  among those BHCs that ultimately  undergo
either  management  turnover  or regulatory  intervention.  While the motivation  for regulatory  action
makes this result for the regulatory goup  alnost  a truism, it is also clear that boards of banks do
respond,  however  weakly,  to poor performance.
The finding that both the stock market and accounting  measures  of performance are
significantly better at BHCs that undergo a friend$  merger than at those undergoing no control
change  suggests  that the motivation for  such mergers may not be the expectation  of better
performance resulting from  a change in poor managerial poliry.  Mergers may, for  example, be
more motivated by the acquirer's desire to diversi$  operations across  state lines or capitalize upon
another  bank's  customer  base. In these  cases,  BHCs may look for potential targets  that fit their
desire  to diversi$r  but that are already  performing  well and do not require the bidder  to engage  in
the costly  process  of restructuring  the bank's  operations  and turning the bank around.
Table  III also  suggests  that size  matters  in determining  the qpe of corporate  control  change.
"Since the hostile tateover  group consists  of only four  BHCs, it  is hard to get statistically significant
differences  between it  and the no control change  group in all but a few variables. Nevertheless,  the higher
abnormal retun  posted for this group may reflect some  contamination  from investor's  expectations  of a future
control chanse.For obvious  reasons,  it appears  easier  to acquire  smaller  BHCs, either through  friendly merger  or
hostile  takeover.
The equity stakes  of large shareholders,  board insiders and board outsiders are ali lower in
those BHCs that undergo regulatory intervention than those that do not experience  a control
change,  consistent with the notion that smaller equity stakes  lead to lower incentives to ensure the
success  of the firm or react  to poor performance  by changing  management  or management  policies.
Equity stakes  held  by board  outsiders  are  higher  and  stakes  held  by  board  insiders  are  lower
in BHCs that undergo  management  turnover relative to the no control change  BHCs.  This is
consistent  with the notion that board  insiders  in these  firms are  less  entrenched  and  board  outsiders
more  determined  to enact  change  in response  to signs  of poor performance.  In addition,  the higher
equity  stakes  held  by insiders  in BHCs that were  the target  of friendly offers  relative  to no control
change  BHCs is consistent  with the notion that insiders  with large  equity  stakes  may  have  financial
incentives  to acquiesce  to merger  offers that do not involve  their immediate  removal.
The zero-one  dummy variable FF has a mean value of 0.09 for a BHC experiencing  a
management  turnover,  versus  0.15  for a BHC eryeriencing  no control change. In other words,  a
BHC that undergoes  a management  turnover  is about  60  percent  as  likely to have  a member  ofthe
founding  family in a top management  position  than a no control change  BHC.  Similarly,  no BHC
that experienced  a hostile takeover  had a member of the founding family as a member of top
management.  Family  founders may be more entrenched managers because they typically have
higher equity stakes  and also have had influence over the selection of the board over a long period
of time.
Similady, the zero-one  dummy  variable  BOSS  has a mean value of 0.10  for a BHC that
experiences  a management  tumover versus  0.77  for a no comtrol change  BHC.  Thus,  a BHC that
undergoes  management  turnover  is about  60  percent  as  likely to be run by a one-man  management18
team (a BOSS)  as  a no control  change  BHC.  In contrast,  targets  of hostile  takeovers  and friendly
mergers  are about 1.5  times  more likely to be run by one-man  management  teams  than no change
BHCs. BHCs that undergo  regulatory  intervention  are also  more likely (about  1.4  times)  to be run
by a BOSS.n
This evidence  suggests  that ownership and board shucture are important in determining the
form  of corporate control change. While the scarcity of hostile takeovers in the sample make it
difficult  to identi$r specific characteristics of BHCs more likely to be subject to a hostile takeover,
it is easier  to identi& distinguishing  characteristics  of BHCs in the three other corporate  control
change  groups. For example,  Table III  suggests  that management  teams of those BHCs that own
large equity stakes,  consist  of family founders  and/or one-man  management  teams,  and whose
outside directors hold relatively small equity stakes may be entrenched enough to avoid internal
discipline  by their board of directors.s [n addition,  those  BHCs for which  market-based  corporate
control mechanisms  fail to operate and who thus become  subject  to intewention by regulators
clearly exhibit lower ownership  concentration  by large equity holders and by inside and outside
board  members.  Market-based  measures  of corporate  control  may  fail in these  cases  because  there
is no agent  in management,  on the board,  or among  shareholders  that has a large enough  equity
stake  to provide  adequate  incentives  to monitor the  performance  of the BHC and  take  appropriate
action  when  performance  begins  to deteriorate.
The following  section investigates whether these conclusions are robust to multivariate
analysis.
Multivariate analysis  of corporate  control changes. I present  four-choice  logit estimates  of the
determinants  of the form of control  change.  The  four choices  are:  complete  management  turnover,
zAlthough note that these  last two differences  are not statistically significant.
oThese are essentially  the conclusions  of MSV ftom their analysis  of a sample of manufacturing  fums.19
friendly  merger,  regulatory  intervention,  and  no control  change.  I delete  the  hostile  takeover  choice
from  my universe since there are so few of these observations (four)  in the sample.  Table IV
presents the multinomial logit models for two different specifications using two different measures
of performance  (RETURN and ROE) along  with measures  of inside board ownership  (INSIDE),
large shareholder ownership (LARGE), the natural log of BHC size (LN SIZE), and whether there
was  a one-man  management  team  in place  (BOSS).' In each  case,  the coefficients  on the  variables
for the no control  change  group  are  normalued to zero. Table  V presents  the implied  probabilities
from the logits for the specification using ROE as a measure of performance.-
Columns 1 and 2 of table IV  show that using either return on equity (ROE) or abnormal
stock return (REZURI$ as a measure  of performance,  relative to the probability of being a no
control change  BHC, the probabiliry  of top management  turnover  is higher  when the BHC is not
run by a one-man  management  team,  when  board  insiders  hold smaller  equity  stakes  and  when  the
return  on equity is lower.  The log odds of a management turnover versus no outcome is not
significantly affected by the size of the firm  or by the combined equity stakes  of all greater-than-5
percent  shareholders.  In terms  of probabilities,  column 1 of table  V indicates  that starting  from a
"base  case" in which LN  SIZE and BOSS are set equal to their mean and /NS1DE, LARGE  and
ROE arc set  equal  to their medians,  when  ROE falls to the top of its lowest  quarti.le,  the estimated
probability of a management  turnover rises  from 11.7  percent  to 16.1  percent.'z6  The estimated
zA number  of olher specificalions  were  tried.  The family  founder  dummy  (Fr!  showed  the same  sign  and
signilicance  pattern as the /NSIDE variable when used  in the specification  in placn  of INSIDE- When included
together with the INSIDE  variable,  FF became  insignificant.
sThe implied probabilities  for the alternative  measure  of performance-abnormal  returns-were little different
from those  presented  here.
aI must start from a set of initial conditions--a  "base''  case-since  the marginal effects  of the regressors  upon
the inplied  probabilities in a multinomial logit model depends  upon the initial  values of a1l  the independent
variables.  See  Maddala  (1983).probability drops  from 11.7  percent  to 7.4  percent  in the presence  of a.BOSS,  whereas  it rrses
2n
to
14.9  percent in the absence  of a BOS^S.  Similarly, the estimated  probability of a management
turnover  rises  from 11.7  percent  to 14.6  percent  as  the insider  equity stake  (INSIDE) falls from its
median to the top of its lowest quartile.  These numbers suggest  that ROE, BOSS and 1NS1DE  are
economically important  as well as statistically significant in determining which BHCs undergo a
management tufnover.
Columns  3 and 4 of table  IV show  that the log odds  of a friendly acquisition  relative  to no
outcome is significantly negatively related to the size of the BHC, but to nothing else--in  particular
the existence  of a one-man  management  team,  board  insider  and  large  shareholder  equity  stake  and
either measure of bank performance (ROE or REXURN) have no statistically significant influence
on the log odds  of a friendly acquisition  relative to no control change.
Consistent with the earlier evidence  from tlte univariate analysis,  columns 5 and 6 of table
IV show  that the log odds  of regulatory  intervention  versus  no outcome  increase  with the size  of
the firm and decrease  with the equity stakes  of insiders  and large shareholders.  As one might
erpect,  the odds  of regulatory  intervention  also  increase  with poorer performance  as  measured  by
ROE or  RETURN.  Column 3 of table V implies that, of these factors, the strongest effects lie in
the extent to which large shareholders  and insiders own big stakes  in the BHC.  Starting at the base
case,  the probability of regulatory  intervention  increases  from 19.6  percent  to 26.8  percent  as the
equity stake held by large shareholders  (I-4RGE)  falls from its median value to the top of its lowest
quartile value.  The probability of regulatory  intervention increases  from  19.6  percent to 28.9
percent as the equity stake held by insiders (lNSlDE)  falls from its median to the top of its lowest
quartile. Thus  large  shareholder  and  insider equity  stakes  appean  to be important in determining
whether  or not a BHC undergoes  regulatory  intervention.
ConclusionsIn this article, I explore the effectiveness  of various corporate control mechanis-,  i.  ,;"
banking industry.  My  analysis suggests  that while  the market-based mechanisms of  eorporate
control in BHCs appear to operate in the same  broad fashion as  in manufacturing firms, there may
be weaknesses  in the etl'ectiveness  of two aspects  of the corporate  control mechanism  in BHCs:
hostile takeovers  and intervention  by the board of directors. These  weaknesses  may make the
corporate  control problem  in banking  more severe  than in nonbank  sectors.
My  analysis confirmed  the conventional wisdom that  hostile  takeovers do not  play an
important role in disciplining management  in BHCs.  I found little  evidence  of the disciplinary role
of friendly mergers,  which appeared  to take place primarily among  BHCs that were perlbrming well.
This  result  suggests  that the main motivation  for friendly  acquisitions  may  be  for reasons  other  than
disciplining current management  to increase  shareholder  value. If so, the primary responsibility for
disciplining  managers  at BHCs rests  with boards  of directors.
Boards of  BHCs (like those of manufacturing firms) do appear to respond to poor
performance. Both the univariate and multivariate analysis  imply that poor performance increases
the probability  of  disciplinary action by the board on current management.  Overall, however,
boards appear to  be  /ess assertive in  their  corporate governance  responsibilities than  in
manufacturing  firms. Board-induced  turnover  of current  management  in my sample  of BHCs is  half
as frequent than in MSV's sample of manufacturing firms.t
Why might this be the case? Recall that, like boards of manufacturing firms, bank boards
appear  weaker in disciplining management  when managers  are entrenched  because  of relatively high
levels of  insider ownership or  low  levels of  board outsider ownership, or  when one-man
'One  manifestation of this weakness  may be in the fact that boards of BHCs are about 50 percent larger
than boards of nonfinancial fums.  The mean number of directors in my sampie of BHCs is 18.0,  compared  to
12.1  for Byd  and Hickman's (1992) sanple of nonfinancial firms.  Large boards are likely more unwieldy and
less  capable  of responding  quickly to management  problens.  If management  realizes  this, then they may seek
to entrench thernselves  by inueasing the size of the board.management  teams  are in place. Thus,  management  may  be more insulated  from board action  in
banks  if bank managers  hold more equity  than do managers  at nonbanks,  if one-man  management
teams  are  more iiequent among  BHCs than they  are  among  nonbanks,  or if outside  board  member
ownership is lower at banks. The evidence  suggests  that at least the first two factors cannot explain
the  weakness  of bank  boards.  One-man  management  teams  appear  no more frequent  among  BHCs
than among  manutacturing  firms. In MSV's sample  of manufacturing  firms, one-man  mangement
teams  occurred  with a frequency  of 23.3  percent,  while they  occur  with a frequency  of 19.7  percent
in my sample  of BHCs.  Similarly, insider equity stakes  do not appear  larger in banks than in
nonfinancial  firms.  Byrd and Hickman (1992)  report that the mean and median insider equity
stakes  for their sample  of nonfinancial  firms are 10.9  percent  and  2.0  percent  respectively,  compared
with 4.1  percent  and 1.3  percent  for my sample  of BHCs.
Outside directors, however, da appear to take larger stakes in nonfinancial firms than in
banks, judging by a comparison with  the Byrd  and Hickman  study.  They found the mean and
median equity stake  held by board outsiders  in their sample  of firms was 2.0 percent and 0.08
percent  respectively,  compared  to 1.0  percent and 0.05  percent for my sample  of BHCs.  Thus
boards conceivably may be weaker in banks because outside directors hold less equity and are
presumably  less  motivated  to impose  disciplinary  measures  on management.
Whatever the reason for weaker boards among BHCs, when combined with the regulatory
impediments on hostile takeovers, they may contribute to a corporate governance  mechanism in
banks that is not as efficient at disciplining managers  as those mechanisms  in other sectors. For
example, MSV  found  that  corporate boards were particularly  weak in  removing unresponsive
managers  in manufacturing firms that were in declining sectorc  and that required radical downsizing
and restructuring.  In these sectors,  the restructuring function was primarily  pefformed by hostile
takeovers. MSV term this situation a third-best solution,  on the gfounds that internal control2i
devices  are inherently cheaper  to operate and more conducive  to long-term  planning than are
hostile  takeovers.  In  the  banking industry  however, while  boards are  even weaker than  in
manutacturing sectors,  the use of hostile takeovers as an important method of restructuring is also
ruled out. By default,  this  void has  given  regulators  a primary  role in providing  a last-resort  control
mechanism-what  might be termed a fourth-best  solution,  since  takeover  by regulators  is almost
certainly  far more costly  than any  market-based  alternative.
These  results suggest  that policymakers should take corporate control issues  serious\  when
considering  legislative  alternatives  to the curent  system  of bank regulation  and organization. In
particular,  the finding that banks  that have  undergone  regulatory  intervention  have  markedly  lower
ownership  concentration  than other banks  suggests  that higher ownership  concentration  among
banks might improve performance by motivating greater oversight and monitoring by large
stakeholders  and their representatives  on the board of directors. If  so, current restrictions  on
potential owners  of commercial  banks  may have  costs. Some  of the proposed  banking  legislation
in Congress  could also be evaluated in this light, since different proposals vary quite substantially
in the degree  to which they relax the current restrictions  on permissible  bank owners.
In addition, the absence  of a credible takeover threat among banks appears  to have a
marked influence on the effectiveness  of the corporate  control mechanism  operaling in banks.
While regulators  have  been  caieful not to discriminate  actively  against  bank mergers  on the basis
of whether  they are hostile or not, the long regulatory  process  that all bank mergers  have to go
through tends to make hostile takeovers  much more difficult  to achieve  than friendly mergers: This
suggests  that there may be beneficial  effects  on the corporate  control mechanism  in banks  from
removing some of the more obvious obstacles to hostile takeovers in  banking by, for  example,
relaxing interstate banking regulations  and increasing  the speed  with which regulators  process
merger  applications.24
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Data Delinitions  and Sources
Variable Definition
RETURN  Cumulative abnormal return,  1985-86  from the monthly CAPM, estirnated
over 1983-86.  Source: CRSP
ROE  Annual average  return on equity, 1987  to year of control change,  or, if no
control change,  to 1992. Source:  COMPUSTAT
INSIDE  Equity stakes  of insiders  (current  management  team) on the board of
directors  in 1987  as a percent  of total outstanding  shares.  Source:  SEC
filings
OUTSIDE  Equity stakes  of outsiders  on the board in 1987  as a percent  of total
outstanding  shares.  Source: SEC Filings
LARGE  Combined  equity stake  of greater  than 5-percent  shareholders  in 1987  as
a percent  of total outstanding  shares.  Source: SEC filings
FF  Dummy  =  1 if any signer of the annual report is  member of the founding
family or of the family of a previous signer of the annual report.  Source:
Annual reports, Who's Wo  in American Banking
-BOSS  Dummy  =  1 if only one executive signs the annual report and no other
executive  holds  the title of chairman,  CEO or president. Source:  Annual
reDorts
SIZE Market value of equity in 1987  in millions of dollars.  Source:
COMPUSTAT28
Table III
Performance, Management, and Ownership Characteristic Means by Control Outcome in 234
Bank Holding Companies
Management  Hostile  Friendly  Regulatory  No control
turnover  takeover  merqer  intervention  change
Number ofBHCs  22 425 45  150
Perfomunce (in percent)
RETURN  -77.5Eo*  5.3Vo  9.5Vo***  -72.9Vo*  -7.9Vo
ROE  5.780*  12.2Vo  13.8Vo***  0.2Va***  l0.2Vo
Ftn  Sin  (in $millions)
SIZE  630.2  354.1*  438.1*  915.6  777.4
Owtgtthip  Strudure (in percent)
LARGE  75.LVo  38.2/o+  1597o  17.28a*  15.0/a
OUTSIDE  1.8Vo"  7.0Vo  7.27o  0.3Va*  0.9Va
INSIDE  2980*  7.2Vo**  5.0%  2.5Vo*  4.4Va
Management  Clmmcteristias  (nro-one duntnies)
Family founder on
management  team (FF)  0.09*  0  0.11  0.03*  0.15
One-man  management
team  (BOSS)  0.10*  0.25  0.26  0.U  0.17
For definitions  of variables,  see  Table  II.
*, **, *** indicate  means  are significantly  different from the no-control  change  category  at the
10  percent,  5 percent,  and 1  percent  levels  respectively.30
Table IV
Multinomial  Logit Models of Control Outcomes
Four-choice logit estimates of the determinants of the form of control change,  using two different
specifications. The four choices  are: management  turnover, friendly merger, regulatory intervention
and  no control  change.  Each  specification  uses  a different  measure  of performance  (RETURN or
ROE) along  with measures  of inside board ownership  (INSIDE), large shareholder  ownership
(I-A,RGE),  the natural log of bank holding company  size (LN SIZE) and whether  there is a one-
man  management  team  in place  (BOSS). In each  specification,  the coefficients  on the variables  for
the no-control  change  group  (not shown)  are  normalized  to zero. Absolute  values  of t-statistics  are
























































































Estinated  Pmbabilities  from Multinomial  Itgit  Model*
Estimated  probabilities  for three types  of control change-management  turnoverj friendly merger
and regulatory  intervention-from the multinomial logit model estimated  in table 4 using  ROE as
the measure  of performance.  The "base  case"  is estimated  for the case  where  lN  SIZE and  BOSS
are at their means  for the entire sample,  ^nd LARGE, INSIDE and ROE are at their medians. The
rows ibllowing the base  case  are estimated probabilities evaluated at various points, differing from
the base  case  only in the value  of the indicated  independent  variable.
Probability  of
Management  Friendly  Regulatory
turnover  merser  intervention
Base  case
BOSS  present
No BOSS  present
ROE at top of
lowest  quartile
L,ARGE  at top of
lowest  quartile
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